Observers have argued about whether highly-educated women are opting out of their careers and for families. If so, it is natural to expect fertility to increase and, insofar as children are associated with lower employment, further declines in employment. This paper provides a comprehensive study of recent trends in the fertility of college-graduate women. We study fertility at a range of ages; consider both the intensive and extensive margins, explore a range of data sets; and study the period from 1940 to 2006. In contrast to most existing work, we find that college graduate women are indeed opting for families. Fertility increases at almost all ages along both the intensive and extensive margins since the late 1990s or 2000 and this recent increase in fertility is consistent across datasets.
I. Introduction
A number of high-profile reports have indicated that after years of reducing their fertility and increasing their employment, highly-educated women are increasingly opting out of careers (Belkin [2003] , Wallis [2004] , Story [2005] , Stone [2008] ). In contrast to the popular accounts, the scholarly literature on opting out is small and generally casts doubt on the opting out phenomenon. Although the popular and scholarly work on opting out tend to differ in both size and conclusions, they line up more closely when it comes to focus, with both emphasizing changes in women's employment.
1 If women are opting for families over careers, it would be natural to expect an increase in fertility. And, insofar as childbirth is associated with a reduction in employment, at least in the short run, an increase in fertility may foreshadow weaker labor attachment conditional on fertility in the future.
This paper deviates from most existing work in focusing on fertility. We provide a comprehensive study of highly-educated women's fertility. Our results demonstrate that college graduate women are opting for families, with fertility increasing among collegegraduate women at almost all ages and along both intensive and extensive margins since the late 1990s or 2000. Whether the increase in fertility we observe is associated with a reduction in employment (opting out of careers) or an increased burden on women is an important question, one that we leave for future work. Figure 1 summarizes the main trends in the data parsimoniously, showing the 1 As discussed below, a number of researchers have studied the child employment gap or penalty, the gap in employment between women with and without children.
average number of children born to college graduate women from different birth cohorts at a range of ages (this measure combines intensive and extensive margins, which are separated out below). The longer series, based on Census and Current Population Surveys (CPS), shows 3 major shifts. The first shift is a large increase in fertility from the low levels of the cohorts born at the end of the 19 th and the beginning of the 20 th century through the cohorts born in the 1930s. This increase in fertility corresponds to the baby boom and is in keeping with Goldin [1997] , who argues that until 1941, marriage bars limited the ability of college women to have both children and careers. The second major shift is a dramatic decline and delay in fertility, which runs through the birth cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s. This decline in fertility erases a large portion of the earlier increase, especially at younger ages, reflecting delayed fertility. Placed in the context of the long-term trends, it is clear that the recent increase in fertility is small, but it holds across age groups.
We are aware of two studies that include estimates of recent trends in fertility of highly-skilled women (along with a range of other outcomes). 3 Both studies, while valuable, have limitations and ironically they come to opposite conclusions. Vere [2007] studies mean cumulative fertility (or the number of children born) focusing on 27 year old college-educated women between 1982 and 2002. He finds an increase in fertility for this group, but 27 is early in the childbearing years, especially for college-educated women. Changes in fertility in the 20s may say more about the timing of fertility than completed fertility, with fertility later in life partially or fully offseting these early-life trends.
The only other studies to consider the fertility aspect of opting out, Percheski [2008] , finds no increases in fertility among professional women. Her sample of women in professional or managerial occupations, has the advantage of pinpointing women in high-powered careers, but makes her results somewhat hard to interpret because women who have more children or choose to reduce their hours may switch to less intense occupations. (Our analysis, like most, addresses this concern by defining the sample using education which, while affected by expectations over employment, will be much less responsive to short-term decisions.)
As indicated, there is somewhat more work on the employment aspect of opting out. Boushey [2005] studies trends in the labor force participation among women in their childbearing years (between age 25 and 44). She argues that declines in women's employment between 2000 and 2004 are due to business cycle effects. She also studies the child-penalty -the gap in labor force participation between women with and without young children -finding that it has declined in recent years. Cohany and Sok [2007] find that the labor force participation rate of highly educated married mothers declined in the The present paper is considerably more comprehensive than the relatively small and contradictory work on recent trends in fertility among highly educated women in a number of ways. We study fertility at a range of ages from the 20s through the 40s; we consider both the intensive and extensive margins, including the mean number of children born, childlessness, and the distribution of the number of children; we estimate fertility from a variety of data sets including the Census, CPS, and Vital Statistics Birth Data (matched to the CPS); and our data covers a considerably longer time span than existing studies -from 1940 through 2006.
We find clear evidence of an increase in fertility that is specific to highly educated women since the late 1990s or 2000. Although not directly related to opting out, we also find a dramatic increase in plural births, especially among older women. We take this increase in plural births as evidence of fertility treatment.
Interestingly, our estimates of the distribution of children born may help to explain others' results. For instance, we find a decrease in women with no children in recent years. If more women with strong labor market attachment are now having children, as they have more children, the difference in employment between women with and without children may drop even if it is increasing for any given woman.
II. Data
Two major data sources are used in this paper to study the fertility patterns of college graduate women: the decennial Censuses extended with the Fertility Supplement to the June Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Vital Statistics Birth Data from the National Center for Health Statistics combined with population data from the March CPS.
We use the 1% samples of the 1940-2000 Censuses. We focus on women with 16 or more years of school. 4 The 1940-90 Censuses ask women about "the number of children ever born." 5 Unfortunately, "the presence and age of own children" is the only fertility variable in the 2000 Census. Thus it is not possible to estimate the number of children born for women in their 40s because as children move out of the house, childlessness is overstated.
We use the Fertility Supplement to the June CPS to extend the Census-based 4 The definition of educational attainment in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and the CPS in and after 1992 is based on the highest degree attained instead of the number years of school as in earlier surveys. Along with the March CPS and the Vital Statistics (discussed below) data, the degree-based classification was converted back to one based on years of completed schooling by weighting births by women with a college degree or higher on the new certificates by 1.007599 based on Jaeger [1997] . 5 In the 1940-60 Censuses, only ever-married females were asked the fertility question. Beginning with 1970 Census, all females aged 14 or above were asked the fertility question.
analysis to the most recent years. The June CPS asked women aged 14 to 44 how many children they had ever had, which is very similar to the fertility question in the 1940-90
Censuses, providing a useful alternative to the 2000 Census. One (relatively modest) disadvantage of these data is that they only provide fertility information on women through age 44, complicating comparisons with the Census. They also provide considerably smaller samples, which becomes relevant as we focus on relatively narrow groups. The latest release of the Fertility Supplement is the 2006 June CPS.
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For any given year, the estimates reported below are for cells that combine multiple birth years or years of age. To control for changes in the age distribution of the population within each cell, we first construct means for individual birth years or years of age and then average these within each cell. plausibility of this assumption is provided in the Data Appendix.
A natural concern with our procedure arises for women completing college after age 23. To address this concern, we convert all variables to shares of the population before constructing the stock variables from the flow variables. This procedure implicitly uses the distribution of the number of children among women who had already completed college by a given age to impute the distribution among women completing college at that age. (A procedure that generates stocks from flows first and then converts them to population shares implicitly assumes that women having children at later ages have not had any children. Estimates from the two procedures are broadly similar.) A variety of other potential biases are also discussed in the data appendix.
Figure 1 (discussed above) reports the average number of children born by women by varying ages using the Vital Statistics. These estimates are the cumulative sum of the age-specific birth rates (of all parities) from age 23 till that age. This procedure is similar to Vere [2007] . Childlessness did not decline even though marriage rates increased because among ever-married women between 40 and 49, childlessness increased from 21.5% for the 1891-1900 cohort to 27.3% for 1901-10 cohort.
III. Results

Long-Term Trends
11 Goldin and Katz [2002] and Bailey [2006, Forthcoming] both emphasize the importance of the birth control pill, but others have emphasized changes in family income and women's wages (e.g. Becker [1991] Completed fertility also decreases, but substantially less, with childlessness in the 40s increasing and then stabilizing at around 25% for the 1941-50 cohort and the ones that followed. 12 Our calculations show that the mean number of children declined by more . This increase constitutes a break from the previous trend to lower fertility and will be visible when we look at 5-year birth cohorts in Figure 2 and Table 2 below.
childlessness is larger in the Vital Statistics at older ages and larger in the Census / CPS at younger ages but despite these differences, the two series track one another and, taken together, show a decline in childlessness in recent years at all ages.
This decline in childlessness constitutes a break in the long-term trend toward lower and delayed fertility since the 1941-50 cohort, although it is impossible to extrapolate to the completed fertility of the younger cohorts (e.g. the 1971-80 cohort).
The timing corresponds to the media reports of college women opting out of labor market. We will next look at recent trends in the fertility of college women in detail. The composition of college graduates has changed considerably over time, with the share who are native-born, non-Hispanic, and white declining. Changes in the immigrant population or the racial or ethnic composition of the population may affect these estimates. To ensure that our estimates are not due to changes in the composition of college-graduates, and to probe the statistical significance of these estimates Appendix 
Recent Trends
Decomposing Recent Trends
Changes in marital status are likely to affect fertility and the fertility of ever married and never married women may change differently. Table 4 shows trends in marital status and trends in childlessness among ever married and never married women.
The top panel shows that the share of women who have never been married has increase over time among women aged 25-29 and 40-44, but that it has been fairly stable among women in their 30s since 1990. The second panel shows that although childlessness among never-married, college graduate women is quite high (always above 85%), it has decreased substantially since its peak in the mid to late 1980s. Among women aged 25-29, the share with children more than triples from roughly 2.5% in 1980 and 1985 to 9% 13 We did not control for marital status because it might be endogenous, but we stratify by marital status below.
in 2006. The changes in the other age groups are similar in absolute magnitude although smaller in percentage terms. Ever-married women also show declines in childlessness, but these declines start later -in the early to mid 1990s -and are smaller. Because changes in the share of women who have never been married are small and vary across groups, most of the recent decline in childlessness is due to declines within the ever married and never married groups. However, the contribution of changes among nevermarried women is greatest at young ages, where a larger share of women have never been married.
Other Groups
It is possible that recent increases in fertility among college-graduate women are part of a larger trend toward greater fertility. To address this question, we study trends in fertility at a variety of education levels. Table 5 shows that the large decline in Thus, the trend toward higher fertility is greatest among highly-educated women.
Birth Distribution
It is natural to consider whether fertility increased along the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin. If women who are already having children increase the number of children they have then fertility increases along the intensive margin. In studying changes in fertility along the intensive margin, it is worth bearing in mind that as more women have children, if the marginal mothers tend to have relatively few children, the mean number of children among women who have children may fall even as fertility increases among inframarginal mothers. Table 6 shows that among women who have children, the average number of children born increases in all but the oldest age groups between 2000 and 2004/6. This increase in conditional fertility for all but the oldest groups, indicates a substantial increase in fertility along the intensive margin at younger ages and perhaps an increase at older ages as well. Having exactly 2 children is, in a sense, the break point in the distribution.
Among women in their late 30s, the share with exactly 2 children increases through the cohorts born in the middle of the century, then declines, increasing again in the most recent years. By the 1931-35 cohort, having 2 children is the dominant choice, and the meaning of these trends in the share of women with exactly 2 children shifts. The increase in women with exactly 2 children among the early cohorts is part of the increase in fertility, coinciding with the decline in women with no children or 1 child and the increase in women with 3 and 4+ children. In the cohorts born in the middle of the century, the increase and then decrease in the share of women with exactly 2 children is part of the decline in fertility, coinciding with the decrease in the share of women with 3
and 4+ children and the increase in women with no children or exactly 1 child. In the most recent years, the increase in fertility is reflected in an increase in the number of women with exactly 2 children. The estimates from the Vital Statistics are similar to those from the Census and CPS in both their levels and timing.
The other panels generally echo these patterns. For natural reasons, the panels for women in their late 20s and early 30s both show considerably more women with no children and considerably fewer women with 3 and 4+ children (and correspondingly smaller shifts for these groups). Again for natural reasons, the panel for women in their early 40s, which is effectively completed fertility, shows even higher shares of women with 1, 2, 3, and 4+ children but fewer women with no children.
As in Figures 1 and 2 , the Vital Statistics show higher and more stable fertility for the youngest women and lower and more rapidly increasing fertility for the oldest women than the Census and CPS. The Vital Statistics also show more women with 4+ children and fewer women with exactly 3 children than the Census and CPS in the late 30s and 40s. Subject to these differences, data from the two sources is generally similar in both levels and trends. This similarity is particularly true for women in their early 30s.
The delay in fertility is also evident in these figures Statistics, by contrast, show a substantial increase in fertility at older ages. Thus despite the somewhat contradictory evidence and despite the limited the scope for adjusting cumulative fertility at older ages, we find some evidence that college graduate women are for opting for higher fertility even at older ages.
In summary, there is evidence that fertility has increased between 2000 and 2006 more generally. Comparing these years (these are the last 2 points for the Census / CPS on each graph), at all four sets of ages, the CPS shows that the share of women with no children has decreased and, with the exception of women in their early 40s with exactly 3 children, the share of women with 1, 2, 3, and 4+ children have all increased for all four age groups. The Vital Statistics also show a clear increase in fertility, especially at older ages. Figure 5 plots the share of children born to college graduate women who were born in a plural birth. 14 The rate of plural births increased dramatically over time. And while it increases among all age groups, the increase is substantially greater for older women. (We are not aware of explanations for the initial decline among 40-44 year old women, although it reverses dramatically in subsequent years.) In the late 1970s, the plural birth rate was only slightly higher for older women than younger women, but they begin to spread apart around 1990. From 1976 to 2002, the plural birth rate increased by slightly more than 50% (from 2% to just over 3%) among college women aged 23 to 29, but among college-graduate women in their early 40s, the plural birth rate nearly triples (from under 3% to under 8%).
Plural Births
The initially higher rate of plural births among older women is consistent with physiological evidence that older women are more likely than younger women to have 14 These estimates are weighted by children, so each child in a set of twins, triplets, etc. is counted separately. Implicitly, higher-order plural births receive more weight. These results are based on the 46 multiple births, but this physiological mechanism can not explain the greater increase in plural births among older women. The greater increase among older women appears to be due to greater use of fertility treatments. Martin et. al [2007] write, "These therapies consistent across datasets.
Our finding that highly educated women are increasingly choosing not to sacrifice their families for careers raises a number of questions that we leave to future work. At a factual level -when women opt for families, are they opting out of the labor market, as has been argued in the media, are they (somehow) opting to have both families and careers?
Our finding that women are increasingly opting for families also calls for explanations. One potential explanation is a learning story, whereby higher fertility is a reaction to previous generations of women who postponed fertility and ultimate had little opportunity to have families. Another explanation involves selection -as more women have gone to college, the average college graduate woman is likely to have become less career oriented. Some such a shift may have occurred over the 20 th century as a whole, but the extent to which it can explain changes in fertility over the past decade is less clear. 16 A number of researchers have pointed to the growth in personal services in recent years (Mazzolari and Ragusa [2007] ; Autor and Dorn [2008] ; and Cortes and Tessada [2008] ). An increase in the supply of personal services would reduce the price to women of having children, allowing women to shift the burden to the market. Alternatively, Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern [2008] have argued that men may be taking more responsibility for child care. Lastly, the gender wage gap, which had been closing rapidly since the 1970s has since been constant, so the opportunity cost of women's time is no 15 It is worth noting that the American Society of Reproductive Medicine introduced recommendations in the late 1990s, which were revised in 2004 and 2006, to prevent higher-order multiple gestations. 16 Goldin [1997] casts doubt on selection as a primary explanation for earlier changes.
longer increasing relative to men's time, which may have lead to an increase in fertility. Note. Estimates are from the US Census, except those denoted with an asterisk, which are from the June CPS. The CPS only asks about fertility until age 44, so these estimates only include women up to age 44. Note. Estimates from linear regression models in which 1995 is the base year. Standard errors, which are clustered at the age-year level, reported in parentheses. Estimates control for schooling (among collegegraduates) and dummy variables for years of age (within categories) race (black or other), and Hispanic background. Statistical significance denoted by *** (1%); ** (5%), and * (10%).
Opting for Families: Recent Trends in the Fertility of Highly Educated Women Data Appendix for Vital Statistics Birth Data
There are a number of issues that arise when using the education variables in the Vital Statistics Birth Data. For all analyses, we focus on women who are college graduates or more. College graduates are defined as having at least 16 years of completed school or whose highest degree is bachelor's degree or higher.
Missing Schooling Data for States in Various Years
Data on schooling are missing for a number of states in a variety of years. The states and years with missing data are:
In all cases the adjustments for missing education data were performed for individual years of age and live birth order.
The second approach to the missing data would be to calculate estimates only for the states for which data is available in a given set of years. We have also explored these estimates, and they are similar to those reported.
Missing Individual Information on Schooling for States Reporting Schooling
Even when schooling is reported for a given state, there are missing values for schooling, especially in the early years. 1 We calculate the proportion of women between 23 and 44 with missing data on schooling by year and state and adjust births in each year and state upward by 1/(1-Share Missing) based the share missing schooling in that state in that year. Implicitly, this procedure assumes that probability that data on schooling is missing does not vary with schooling, age, and live birth order conditional state and year. The data for 2005 and 2006 do not contain geographic identifiers. In these years, national data (which exclude possessions and territories) on the share of women with missing data on schooling are used to adjust the data.
Conversion from Degrees Obtained to Years of Completed Schooling
Starting in 2003, some states used new birth certificates on which educated is reported according to degrees obtained as opposed to completed schooling as in prior years. The degree-based classification was converted back to one based on years of completed schooling by weighting births by women with a college degree or higher on the new certificates by 1.007599 based on Jaeger [1997] . Population data in the March Current Population Survey, which switch to a degree-based classification in 1992, are adjusted in the same way.
Missing Information on Parity / Live Birth Order
Live-birth order and parity (coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4+) refer to the total number of live births the mother has had up to a point in time, with fetal deaths excluded. When data on live birth order is missing, we assign a live birth order in proportion to the share of births of that live birth order among all births for which live birth order is reported.
Estimating Distributions of Births by Live Birth Order
To calculate the distribution of the number of children that women have from the birth records, one needs to do a bit of manipulating. We start from age 23 and take the rate of women having a 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and further child at age 23 as the birth probabilities at age 23. Consider women born in 1953, who turned 23 in 1976. We calculate the share of women having a birth at each parity in 1976 using the Vital Statistics data merged to population data from the CPS. To get the distribution of the number of children these women had by age 24, we first calculate the birth rate at each parity in 1977 in the same way as we did for 1976. To get the share of women with exactly 1 child, we then add the share of women who had a 1 st child in 1977 to the share of women who had exactly 1 child in 1976 and then subtract the share of women having a 2 nd child in 1977.
As described here, we calculated the share of women having a 1 st , 2 nd , etc. birth in each year. To get shares from the numbers in the Birth Records, we divide by population figures constructed from the CPS. This method introduces noise because of sampling error in the CPS and because of any differences in reporting in the CPS and Birth Data. While the underlying data are large, individual age-education cells, especially for college graduate women, are considerably smaller. We are not aware of more precise data on the age-education distribution of the population.
Our procedure for estimating the distribution of children born for women assumes that the distribution of children born is equal to the birth rates at age 23. A potential problem arises if college-graduate women have children before age 23 but not again at age 23. If such a woman has children later, we will "subtract" her from lower parity, but she was never counted in the first place. Appendix Figure 1 shows the share of 23-year old women with a given number of children calculated from the Census and CPS and from the Vital Statistics Birth Data. While the estimates from the CPS are noisy because of small samples, the estimates from the Vital Statistics Birth Data are much less noisy. Nevertheless, the two series are quite similar in levels. Under the assumption that the Census and CPS accurately reflect the number of children present and that our procedures with the Vital Statistics produce accurate birth numbers, these estimates imply that most college-graduate women do not have children before age 23, and that most of the ones who have children at age 23 are having their first child. Thus, our use of fertility at age 23 to initialize the birth distribution appears reasonable. Data (not reported here) show that the size of the college-graduate population increases substantially from ages 21 and 22 to age 23 and that the age 23 population is considerably more stable over time.
Because more women complete college as they get older, our method involves one important assumption. To get the correct distribution of the number of children for women at age 24, we need to assume that the distribution of the number of children at age 23 is the same for women who have completed college by age 23 and for women complete college at age 24. If the fraction is larger (smaller) for the latter group (those completing at later ages), then our estimate of fertility is downward (upward) biased. This bias increases as the share of women completing college at later ages increases.
This bias can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider women born in 1953. Assume that the population of college graduates in 1976 when they are 23 years old is 1,000, and that it is 1,100 in 1977. So there are 100 women completing college at age 24. Suppose that 5% of the 1,000 women who had completed college at age 23 in 1976, the fraction with exactly 1 child is 5%, and the fraction with exactly 2 children is 2%, and none of them have more than 2 children. Further assume that at age 23 of the 100 women who will complete college at age 24 in 1977, the fraction with 1 child is 8%, and none of them has more than 1 child (although these shares are not observed in our data). In 1977, we observe that 44 out of the 1,100 college graduates (4%) have a 1 st child, and 11 (1%) have a 2 nd child (and that there is no other fertility among college graduates).
The correct distribution of parities is:
Share with exactly 1 child = (5% * 1,000 + 8% * 100 + 44 -11) /1,100 = [5% * (1,000/1,100) + 8% * (100/1,100)] + 4% -1% = 8.27%; Share with exactly 2 children = (2% * 1,000 + 0% * 100 + 11) /1,100 = [2% * (1,000/1,100) + 0% * (100/1,100)] + 1% = 2.82 % With our method, we get:
Estimated share with exactly 1 child = 5% + 4% -1% = 8% (above the actual value of 8.27%) Estimated share with exactly 2 children = 2% + 1% = 3%; (below the actual value of 2.82%).
The first estimate is biased downward because a greater share of the women who completed college between 1976 and 1977 had children than among the women who had already completed college in 1976. Similarly, the later estimate is biased upward because fewer of the women who completed college between 1976 and 1977 had children than among the women who had already completed college in 1976.
Miss-measurement of population will affect our estimates of the distribution of children too. The most obvious effect is to introduce noise in our estimates. More subtly, because the population estimates are on the denominator of the calculations, pure measurement error will bias our estimates of the share of women with each number of children upward and the share with no children (the residual category) downward. This bias does not appear to be too strong insofar as it would imply that estimates of childlessness would decline with age in the Vital Statistics relative to the Census / CPS, whereas our estimates of childlessness from the Vital Statistics tend increase with age relative to the Census / CPS.
Appendix Figure 1 . Comparing the Fertility in the Birth Records and CPS at age 23. 
